The Third District in Miller v. Lifestyles Senior Housing Managers et al., No. C059843, 2010 WL 3398750 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. Aug. 31, 2010), affirmed the trial court’s judgment confirming an arbitrator’s decision denying statutorily mandated attorneys fees to the prevailing plaintiff. Id. *1. Continue reading
Jim Brown and Marc Koonin of the California Employment Law Letter offer a useful Top 10 list of “Need to Knows” about California wage & hour laws:
In a positive development for both plaintiffs and defendants, a bill establishing an expedited jury trial procedure has sailed through the California Legislature. The Wall Street Journal Law Blog and The Recorder reported today that Assembly Bill No. 2284 was approved by the legislature on a unanimous vote. The bill, entitled the Expedited Jury Trials Act, was introduced by Assembly Member Noreen Evans (D-Santa Rosa). It calls for the establishment of strealined jury trials in civil cases, where the parties stipulate to them. Some of the highlights:
The First District Court of Appeal held that Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Order No. 17 do not apply to public employees. California Correctional Peace Officer’s Association, et al. v. State of California, No. A125679, 2010 WL 3248794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 18, 2010). The California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association (CCPOA) filed a class action, contending that the State of California violated various Labor Code provisions, as well as wage orders promulgated by the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC), by failing to provide correctional officers with meal periods and by failing to pay for the missed wage periods. CCPOA argued that the Legislature intended that the State provide its correctional officers with meal periods as required by Labor Code section 512 and IWC Wage Order No. 17, and that the State must pay for missed meal periods as required by Labor Code section 226.7. The court rejected this argument, holding that “the subject wage and hour statutes do not apply to public employees.” Id. *1. Continue reading
In an unusual move, plaintiffs in Arrendondo v. Delano Farms Company, No. CV F 09-1247 LJO DLB, 2010 WL 3212000 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2010), sought and were granted a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs filed an Application pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 requesting a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) against defendant Delano Farms Company to restrain potential retaliation and threats to witnesses and putative class members by defendant. The Application was supported by declarations of three witnesses and potential class members who heard threats by a supervisor of Delano Farms as well as declarations from Jessica Arciniega and Thomas P. Lynch, attorneys representing plaintiffs, and Aida Sotelo, a paralegal who investigated the threats. Continue reading
Judge George H. King of the Central District denied plaintiff’s remand motion in Lara v. Trimac Transportation Services (Western) Inc., No. CV 10-4280-GHK (JCx), 2010 WL 3119366 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2010).
Plaintiff Miguel Lara’s (“Plaintiff”) brought a motion to remand on the grounds that Defendant Trimac Transportation Services (Western) Inc. (“Defendant”) failed to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The court stated the amount in controversy requirement as follows: Continue reading
Judge James Lorenz faced a remand motion in Martinez v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., Civil No. 09cv2937-L(JMA), 2010 WL 3123175 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010). The court remanded, holding that Defendants did not meet their burden of showing that it is more likely than not that the matter in controversy for the class action exceeds $5 million or that Plaintiff’s individual claims exceed $75,000.
Defendants removed this wage and hour class action from state court based on 28 U.S.C. Sections 1332 and 1441, or in the alternative, on the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1453. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand arguing that Defendants failed to establish the requisite diversity of citizenship and the jurisdictional amount in controversy. Continue reading
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Judge Percy Anderson of the Central District of California faced the question of whether basing a UCL claim partially on a violation of the FSLA creates federal jurisdiction. The Court held that it did not. The case is Williams, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV 10-4761 PA (PJWx), 2010 WL 3184248 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010).
Plaintiffs’ alleged that defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Defendant”) misclassified them as exempt from overtime and failed to pay wages for overtime compensation.
Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as “Home Mortgage Consultants” sometime between February 10, 2001 and the present. During that time, Plaintiffs were paid on a commission sales basis and were never paid any overtime or premium pay. On May 30, 2010, Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, alleging (1) violation California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 for unpaid overtime; (2) violation of California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 for unpaid business expenses; (3) violation California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 for wages not timely paid upon termination; (4) violation California Labor Code § 204 for wages not timely paid during employment; (5) violation California Labor Code § 226(a) for non-compliant wage statements; and (6) violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.
Defendant filed a Notice of Removal on June 28, 2010, alleging federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, maintaining that they have only alleged state law claims, and thus there is no basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendant contended that Plaintiffs have effectively alleged a separate federal claim by alleging violation of the UCL based on violation of the FLSA.
Defendant is asking that this Court treat UCL claims and the violations upon which they are based as one in the same. However, Defendant has not cited, and the Court has not found, any authority which supports this position. Indeed, Defendant’s view seems to directly contradict the California Supreme Court‘s characterization of the UCL as a statute that “borrows” violations of other laws and makes them “independently actionable.” Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have somehow alleged a federal cause of action by basing their UCL claim in part on Defendant’s alleged violation of FLSA.
Defendant also contended that because most of Plaintiffs’ claims stem from their allegations that Defendant misclassified them as exempt from overtime compensation, and Plaintiffs’ overtime claim is entirely dependent on an interpretation of the FLSA, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims depends upon the resolution of whether Defendant violated the FLSA. The court was not persuaded.
Although Defendant is correct in noting that most of Plaintiffs’ claims stem from allegations that Defendant improperly classified them as exempt, there is no indication in the complaint that this misclassification is based on exemptions set forth in federal law, as opposed to California law. . . . Where a plaintiff has alleged a UCL claim based on both the violation of state and federal law, courts have found that federal question jurisdiction does not exist. See, e.g., Holliman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14627 at *13 (N.D. Cal. March 14, 2006) (finding no federal question jurisdiction where UCL claim was based on violations of California Labor Code and FLSA); Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (N.D. Cal. April 11, 2001) (finding no federal question jurisdiction where UCL claim was based on “unfair” misrepresentations and violation of the National Association of Securities Dealers rules); Castro v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19062 at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2000) (finding that even if plaintiffs were basing UCL claim on violation of federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) in addition to violations of California law, claim did not depend on question of federal law because jury could find violation of section 17200 without finding violation of TILA).
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged a UCL claim based on a number of “unlawful” acts, which include two FLSA violations in addition to nine violations of the California Labor Code. Because a single unlawful business practice may give rise to liability under the UCL, a jury could very well find that Defendant violated section 17200 without also finding that it violated the FLSA. As such, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim does not depend upon the resolution of a question of federal law.
Id. **3-4.
A Chicago police sergeant has brought an FLSA collective action against the city for overtime pay related to the off-hours use of his BlackBerry PDA device. The complaint in Allen v. City of Chicago, No. 10-CV-03183, was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. You can view the complaint here.
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The complaint alleges that it is brought by a Chicago Police Sergeant on behalf of himself and other similarly situated members of the Chicago Police Department for purposes of obtaining relief under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq. (hereinafter “FLSA”) for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, declaratory and/or injunctive relief, and/or any such other relief the Court may deem appropriate.
Defendant has willfully violated the FLSA by intentionally failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees all compensation due them under the FLSA and its implementing regulations over the course of the last three years. Defendant administered an unlawful compensation system that failed to provide hourly compensation and premium overtime compensation to employees that work overtime hours “off the clock.” Plaintiff and similarly situated employees were issued personal data assistants (“PDA’s”), such as BlackBerry devices, that they are required to use outside their normal working hours without receiving any compensation for such hours. Defendant’s deliberate failure to compensate its Chicago Police Department employees for these hours worked violates federal law as set forth in FSLA.
The plaintiff’s attorneys are MaryAnn Pohl and Paul D. Geiger.
Significantly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday amended its opinion in Narayan v. EGL, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2010 WL 3035487 (9th Cir. July 13, 2010). The Court had written that “The fact that the Drivers here had contracts ‘expressly acknowledging that they were independent contractors‘ is simply not significant under California’s test of employment.”
The Court replaced this holding with “That the Drivers here had contracts ‘expressly acknowledging that they were independent contractors’ is simply not dispositive under California’s test of employment.”
California Employment Lawyer 