Tag Archives: Class action

Apr 22 2013
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Class Actions

Ninth Circuit Finds Both Class Counsel and Class Representative Inadequate Where Incentive Awards Conditioned on Reps’ Support for Settlement

English: Mimi & Eunice, “Incentive to Create”....

English: Mimi & Eunice, “Incentive to Create”. Categories at the source website: Arguments, IP. Transcript: Mimi: No one would create without monetary incentives. Eunice: Nonsense. People create for all kinds of reasons. Mimi: Who paid you to say that?! (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Today, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s approval of a class action settlement against credit reporting agencies under the Fair Credit Report Act.  Radcliffe, et al v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., et al., Case No. 11-56376, __ F.3d __ (Apr. 22, 2013).  The Court cited a failure by the class representatives and class counsel to adequately represent the class, taking issue with the incentive awards to the class representatives that were conditioned on the class representatives’ support for the settlement.  The court reasoned that these conditional awards caused a divergence of interests between the representatives and the class:

These conditional incentive awards caused the interests of the class representatives to diverge from the interests of the class because the settlement agreement told class representatives that they would not receive incentive awards unless they supported the settlement.

You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Apr 12 2013
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23(b)(3) Class, Class Actions, FLSA, FLSA Collective Action

FLSA Collective Actions Held Not to Be Inherently Inconsistent with State Law Class Actions

Stanford University Memorial Church.

Stanford University Memorial Church. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Today the Ninth Circuit held that FLSA collective actions and state law class actions are not inherently incompatible.  Bush v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., No. 11-16892, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2013).  The district court dismissed warehouse workers’ claims for unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Nevada state law.  The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of state law claims on the basis that they would be certified using different class certification procedures than the federal wage-and-hour claims.  In agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that a FLSA collective action and a state law class action are not inherently incompatible as a matter of law even though plaintiffs must opt into a collective action under the FLSA but must opt out of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

You can read more about the ruling here.

Judges

Before: Jerome Farris, Sidney R. Thomas, and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Thomas.

The case was argued and submitted at Stanford Law School.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Mar 27 2013
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23(b)(3) Class, Certification, Class Actions, Damages Analysis, Experts

Supreme Court Issues Ruling With Implications for Federal Employment Class Actions

English: Supreme Court Associate Justice Anton...

English: Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia testifies before the House Judiciary Committee’s Commercial and Administrative Law Subcommittee on Capitol Hill May 20, 2010 in Washington, DC. Scalia and fellow Associate Justice Stephen Breyer testified to the subcommittee about the Administrative Conference of the United States. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in Comcast Corp., et al. v. Behrend, et al., No. 11-864, 569 U.S. ___ (Mar. 27, 2013), which may impact how employers attack discrimination and other employment class actions.  In a 5 to 4 opinion, the Court reversed certification of a proposed antitrust class action.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, concluded that the class was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3) because plaintiff’s damages model fell short of establishing that damages can be measured classwide.  The District Court and Third Circuit approved certification of a class of more than 2 million current and former Comcast subscribers who sought damages for alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws.

At the trial court level, plaintiffs proposed four theories of antitrust impact, only one of which–the “overbuilder” theory–the trial court accepted.  To establish damages, plaintiffs relied solely on the testimony of Dr. James McClave, who designed a regression model comparing actual cable prices in one area with hypothetical prices that would have prevailed but for defendant’s allegedly anticompetitive practices.  Dr. McClave acknowledged that the model did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact.  Id. at 4.

The Supreme Court held that the class was improperly certified.

By refusing to entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification, simply because those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry. And it is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents’ model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage  calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.

The Court reasoned that the “model failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners’ liability in this action is premised.”  Id. at 8.  Justice Scalia emphasized that “it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question, . . . Such an analysis will frequently entail overlap with the merits of the plaintiff ’s underlying claim.” Id. at 6 (internal quotations omitted).

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Mar 20 2013
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Arbitration, Waiver

California Court of Appeal Reverses Arbitration Order in Wage Case, Citing Viability of Armendariz Bilateriality Rule

English: own work

English: own work (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Yesterday, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District reversed the lower court’s order granting a petition to compel arbitration in a putative wage & hour class action.  Compton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. B236669, — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 2013 WL 1120619 (2d Dist. Mar 19, 2013).  Plaintiff was a property manager who was required to sign an arbitration agreement that also barred arbitration of class claims.  The trial court granted defendants’ petition to compel arbitration.

Normally an order compelling arbitration is not appealable.  But the Court of Appeal determined it had jurisdiction, citing the “death knell” doctrine:

An order compelling arbitration is not appealable. (Elijahjuan v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 15, 19.) The parties argue over whether this matter is appealable under the “death knell” doctrine, which applies when an order effectively terminates a class action. Rather than parse the case law on that issue, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to treat this nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate in this unusual case because: (1) the unconscionability issue is one of law based on undisputed facts and has been fully briefed; (2) the record is sufficient to consider the issue and it appears that the trial court would be only a nominal party; (3) if we were to dismiss the appeal, and the ultimate reversal of the order is inevitable, it would come in a post-arbitration award after the substantial time and expense of arbitrating the dispute; and (4) as a result, dismissing the appeal would require the parties to arbitrate nonarbitrable claims and would be costly and dilatory.

The Court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unconscionably one-sided because (1) it exempted from arbitration claims the employer would more likely bring, such as claims for injunctive or equitable relief from trade secret disclosures; (2) it limited the time to demand arbitration to a period shorter than the relevant statutes of limitation; (3) it retained the statute of limitations period for itself  and (4) it suggested that the arbitrator had the discretion not to award mandatory attorney’s fees under the Labor Code.

The Court determined that it was not violating Concepcion by enforcing Armendariz’s bilaterality rule: Continue reading →

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Mar 19 2013
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CAFA Jurisdiction, Class Actions

Supreme Court Holds CAFA Jurisdiction May Not Be Defeated With Amount in Controversy Stipulation

The top of the west façade of the U.S. Supreme...

The top of the west façade of the U.S. Supreme Court Building (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In a ruling today with substantial implications for California wage & hour and other employment class actions, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that a putative class representative’s stipulation that he and the class would seek less than $5 million in damages does not defeat federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”).  Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, No. 11-1450, 586 U.S. __ (Mar. 19, 2013).

The question presented concerned a class-action plaintiff who stipulates, prior to certification of the class, that he, and the class he seeks to represent, will not seek damages that exceed $5 million in total. Does that stipulation remove the case from CAFA’s scope?

Justice Breyer writing for the Court concluded no, reasoning that stipulations must be binding, and a “plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified.”

We do not agree that CAFA forbids the federal court to consider, for purposes of determining the amount in controversy, the very real possibility that a nonbinding, amount-limiting, stipulation may not survive the class certification process. This potential outcome does not result in the creation of a new case not now before the federal court. To hold otherwise would, for CAFA jurisdictional purposes, treat a nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over substance, and run directly counter to CAFA’s primary objective: ensuring “Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.” §2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 5. It would also have the effect of allowing the subdivision of a $100 million action into 21 just-below-$5-million state-court actions simply by including nonbinding stipulations; such an outcome would squarely conflict with the statute’s objective.

The Court concluded that “the stipulation at issue here can tie Knowles’ hands, but it does not resolve the amount-in-controversy question in light of his inability to bind the rest of the class.”

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Feb 16 2012
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Arbitration, PAGA

Stay of PAGA Claims Pending Arbitration of Individual Claims Not Appealable

English: Macy's Department Store in New York City.

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The Court of Appeal for the First District granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss an appeal, where the employer appellant sought review of a trial court order that did not compel an employee to arbitrate her PAGA claims.  Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc., No. A133411, 202 Cal.App.4th 1119 (1st Dist. Dec. 21, 2011).  The court held that the portion of the trial court’s order that failed to compel employee to arbitrate her class claims and PAGA claims was not immediately appealable; and plaintiff’s PAGA claim was not an individual claim and thus was not within the scope of arbitration request.  Id. (holding that the order granting Defendant’s own motion to compel arbitration of the individual claims “is not appealable, and the remainder of the order denying the motion to dismiss representative [PAGA] claims is not a final judgment and, therefore, also is not appealable . . . .”).

Background

Plaintiff and respondent Reyes brought action against her employer Macy’s, alleging numerous class action labor code violations and a cause of action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”), as well as individual claims for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.  Id.

In the trial court, Macy’s filed a “motion to compel arbitration on an individual basis, dismiss class allegations, and stay civil action,” asking the court to enforce the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, compel the plaintiff to arbitrate individual claims, dismiss class/representative claims and, if the motion were granted, stay the proceedings until arbitration is completed.  Id.  San Francisco Superior Court Judge Charlotte Walter Woolard held that:

All of plaintiff’s individual claims are severed and are subject to arbitration.   These individual claims are to proceed to arbitration.   Plaintiff’s class claims and PAGA claims, and discovery related to those claims, are stayed and shall remain in this court until the individual claims are arbitrated.

Macy’s filed a notice of appeal and plaintiff has moved to dismiss the appeal.

Discussion

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Feb 15 2012
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Class Actions, Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata

In an Employment Case, Denial of Class Certification Cannot Establish Collateral Estoppel Against Unnamed Putative Class Members

The wages of sin drunken macaques

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The Court of Appeal for the Second District held that a denial of class certification cannot establish collateral estoppel against unnamed putative class members. Bridgeford v. Pacific Health Corporation, et al., No. B227486, 202 Cal.App.4th 1034 (2d Dist. Jan. 18, 2012).

Background

Plaintiffs Bridgeford and Tarin filed a class action complaint in May 2010 against Pacific Health Corporation and other entities, alleging that defendants committed numerous wage and hour violations, including (1) failure to pay wages due upon discharge or resignation, (2) failure to pay regular and overtime wages due semimonthly, (3) failure to provide meal breaks, (4) failure to provide rest breaks, (5) failure to provide itemized wage statements, (6) failure to pay minimum wages for time worked off-the-clock, (7) failure to pay overtime wages, and (8) unfair competition.  Id.

The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend.  Id.  Plaintiff’s appealed, contending the trial court misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in holding that their class claims are precluded, and there is no basis to dismiss their individual claims or their representative claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code section 2698, et seq.).

Discussion

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Jan 09 2011
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Class Actions, First to File, FLSA, FLSA Collective Action, Transfer

Eastern District Denies “First to File” Transfer of FLSA Collective and Labor Code Class Action

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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied defendant employer’s motion to transfer pursuant to the “first-to file” rule.  Wilkie v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc., Civ. No. 10-1451 FCD/GGH, 2010 WL 3703060 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010) (slip op.).  Plaintiff filed a putative nation-and California-wide class action/collective action against plaintiff’s former employer Gentiva for alleged violations of the Federal Labor and Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the California Labor Code § 201 et seq. for: (1) misclassification as exempt from overtime pay and failure to pay overtime; (2) willful failure to pay wages due within the time specified by the Code; (3) violation of California Wage Order No. 4 for knowingly and intentionally failing to provide timely, accurate, itemized wage statements including request for an injunction and damages; (4) failure to give proper rest and meal breaks; and (5) violation of California’s Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.  Id. *1

A prior FLSA collective action and New York and North Carolina state law class action against Gentiva was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, entitled Rindfleisch, et al. v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc., No. CV10-2111 (E.D.N.Y.) (“Rindfleisch”). Defendant moved to transfer plaintiff’s complaint under the “first-to-file rule,” on the ground plaintiff’s claims are the subject of the Rindfleisch action. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing the parties and claims are not substantially similar in the two actions and other equitable factors militate against transfer under the first-to-file rule.  Id. The court denied Gentiva’s motion.  Id. Continue reading →

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Jan 09 2011
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Attorneys' Fees, Bonuses, Class Actions, Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata, Trial

Second District Reverses Class Action Judgment Relating to Bonuses Allegedly Due After Merger

Fiber Optic Candle
Image by Chris Tengi via Flickr

The Second District reversed a trial court’s judgment in favor of employees in a class action trial.  Pearline Zalewa v. Tempo Research Corporation, B210429, 2010 WL 3735240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Sept. 27, 2010).  Defendant  fiber-optic equipment manufacturer was sued in a class action by its former employees who claimed that the manufacturer breached an obligation to pay them annual bonuses, an obligation that allegedly continued for years after they were laid off from work during a business downturn.  Id. The court concluded that the employees were not entitled to any recovery: “All but two of the employees relinquished their right to sue when they were laid off, in return for compensation that exceeded their earned severance pay. In any event, there was no promise made to pay bonuses to the employees after they were laid off.”  Id.

The Trial Court’s Judgment

The trial court conducted a bench trial in January 2008, finding that plaintiffs were entitled to recover a direct bonus under theories of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, accounting, and unfair business practices. Id. The court deemed the bonus payments to be “wages” under the Labor Code. Id. And because the bonus payments are wages, plaintiffs were awarded prejudgment interest and attorney fees under the Labor Code. Id. The court enumerated the amount of the award for each employee, less offsets for monies already paid by defendants, plus interest. Id. The total amount of the award, including interest, was approximately $99,000, and plaintiffs’ counsel was awarded attorney fees of $881,715.  Id. Continue reading →

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Jan 09 2011
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23(b)(3) Class, Claims, Class Actions, Contract, Paystub, Vacation, Wages

Class Certification Granted in Vacation, Uniform, Paycheck, Wage and Contract Class Action

New Orleans, LA, September 6, 2008 -- FEMA Com...
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The Southern District of California granted class certification in a vacation, uniform, paycheck, wage and contract class action.  Lopez v. G.A.T. Airline Ground Support, Inc., No. 09cv2268-IEG(BGS), 2010 WL 3633177 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (slip op.).

Background

Former employees of Defendant G.A.T. Airline Ground Support, Inc. (“GAT”) sued for systematic wage and hour violations in violation of federal and state law. Id. *1.  GAT provides services to airlines, including ground transportation, aircraft maintenance, and cargo operations management.  Id. The four named Plaintiffs are former ramp agents employed by GAT in California.  Id. Continue reading →

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