Category Archives: Arbitration

Jun 20 2013
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Arbitration, Class-wide Arbitration, Concepcion, Waiver

Supreme Court Upholds Class Waiver

First photograph of the U.S. Supreme Court, by...

First photograph of the U.S. Supreme Court, by Mathew Brady, 1869 (courtesy of National Archives). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In a five-to-three decision today, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a class waiver in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133, 570 U.S. __ (June 20, 2013).  The Court considered whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.  The Court held that it was.

“Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—as they contracted to do—would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”  Slip Op. at 4.

Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights. . . . One might respond, perhaps, that federal law secures a nonwaivable opportunity to vindicate federal policies by satisfying the procedural strictures of Rule 23 or invoking some other informal class mechanism in arbitration. But we have already rejected that proposition in AT&T Mobility, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

Slip Op. at 5.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, also rejected the argument that “Enforcing the waiver of class arbitration bars effective vindication, respondents contend, because they have no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration.”  Id.

By CHARLES JUNG

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Jun 10 2013
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Arbitrability, Arbitration, Class-wide Arbitration

Unanimous Supreme Court Upholds Arbitrator’s Interpretation of Contract Allowing for Classwide Arbitration

English: Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the...

English: Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The U.S. Supreme Court today unanimously affirmed an arbitrator’s interpretation of an arbitration clause to permit class proceedings.  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, No. 12-135, 569 U.S. __ (June 10, 2013).  The Court considered whether an arbitrator, who found that the parties’ contract provided for class arbitration, “exceeded [his] powers” under §10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq.  Justice Kagan, delivering the opinion of the Court and citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 684 (2010), concluded that the arbitrator’s decision survives the limited judicial review §10(a)(4) allows.

The arbitration clause at issue provided as follows:

No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.

Slip Op. at 2.

The Supreme Court in Oxford Health Plans LLC distinguished Stolt-Nielsen:

The contrast with this case is stark. In Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitrators did not construe the parties’ contract, and did not identify any agreement authorizing class proceedings. So in setting aside the arbitrators’ decision, we found not that they had misinterpreted the contract, but that they had abandoned their interpretive role. Here, the arbitrator did construe the contract (focusing, per usual, on its language), and did find an agreement to permit class arbitration. So to overturn his decision, we would have to rely on a finding that he misapprehended the parties’ intent. But §10(a)(4) bars that course: It permits courts to vacate an arbitral decision only when the arbitrator strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract, not when he performed that task poorly. Stolt-Nielsen and this case thus fall on opposite sides of the line that §10(a)(4) draws to delimit judicial review of arbitral decisions.

Id. at 7.

The Court decided that Oxford must live with its choice of arbitral forum and the arbitrator’s construction of the contract, “however good, bad, or ugly”:

So long as the arbitrator was “arguably construing” the contract—which this one was—a court may not correct his mistakes under §10(a)(4). Eastern Associated Coal, 531 U. S., at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). The potential for those mistakes is the price of agreeing to arbitration. As we have held before, we hold again: “It is the arbitrator’s construction [of the contract] which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.” Enterprise Wheel, 363 U. S. at 599. The arbitrator’s construction holds, however good, bad, or ugly.

Id. at 8 (emphasis supplied).

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Jun 05 2013
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Arbitration, Class-wide Arbitration, Concepcion

PAGA Claims Not Subject to Arbitration, Says Sixth District

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KMODE_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (Photo credit: avlxyz)

The Sixth District yesterday reversed an order compelling arbitration of an employee’s PAGA claims. Brown v. Superior Court (Morgan Tire & Auto, LLC), No. H037271, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (6th Dist. June 4, 2013).  This is a  preview of a question currently pending before the California Supreme Court in the case Iskanian v. CLS Transportation of Los Angeles.  The court in Brown held that “When applied to the PAGA, a private agreement purporting to waive the right to take representative action is unenforceable because it wholly precludes the exercise of this unwaivable statutory right.”

The question presented in this case is whether the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16) (FAA) permits arbitration agreements to override the statutory right to bring representative claims under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) We conclude that the FAA does not demand enforcement of such an agreement. A plaintiff suing for PAGA civil penalties is suing as a proxy for the State. A PAGA claim is necessarily a representative action intended to advance a predominately public purpose. When applied to the PAGA, a private agreement purporting to waive the right to take representative action is unenforceable because it wholly precludes the exercise of this unwaivable statutory right. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1740 (Concepcion) does not require otherwise.

Slip Op. at 1-2.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Apr 19 2013
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Arbitration, Handbook, Mutuality

Second District Orders Published Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc.

Old crest of the club.

Old crest of the club. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Today, the Second District ordered published Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc., et al., No. B237363, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (filed Mar. 21, 2013, modified Apr. 19, 2013).  At the trial court level, the court denied defendants’  motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement to arbitrate lacked mutuality.  Defendants argued that the requisite mutuality was provided by the bilateral arbitration provisions in the employee handbook, incorporated by reference into the arbitration agreement.  The trial court rejected this argument because defendant could change the handbook at its sole discretion and without notice.  The Second District reversed.

The motion to compel arbitration was based on three documents: (1) “Acknowledgment of Receipt of Arbitration and Agreement to Arbitrate”; (2) “Acknowledgment of Receipt of Employee Handbook”; and (3) a copy of the employee handbook.  Plaintiff contended the agreement to arbitrate is one-sided because it requires her to submit claims against her employer to arbitration but does not require her employer to arbitrate its claims against her: “I understand and agree that if my employment is terminated or my employment status is otherwise changed or any other dispute arises concerning my employment . . . , I will submit any such dispute exclusively to binding arbitration.”

The Court of Appeal agreed that if “that the full extent of the agreement, we would likely agree it lacked mutuality because it requires Serpa to submit to arbitration ‘any such disputes’ involving her employment without imposing a similar obligation on CSI.”

However, because the agreement incorporated the arbitration policy in the employee handbook, the Court concluded that this “salvages the agreement by establishing an unmistakable mutual obligation on the part of CSI and Serpa to arbitrate ‘any dispute’ arising out of her employment.”  Plaintiff argued that the while the arbitration policy in the handbook establishes a bilateral obligation to arbitrate, she insisted that the mutual obligation is illusory because, the employer is authorized to alter the terms of any policy contained in the handbook at its sole discretion and without notice.  The Court disagreed, reasoning that the right to alter the terms was limited by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.

The implied covenant of good faith prevents one contracting party from “unfairly frustrating the other party‟s right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349; accord, American Express Bank, FSB v. Kayatta (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.) Thus, it has long been the rule that a provision in an agreement permitting one party to modify contract terms does not, standing alone, render a contract illusory because the party with that authority may not change the agreement in such a manner as to frustrate the purpose of the contract. (See Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 923 [“„where a contract confers on one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, a duty is imposed to exercise that discretion in good faith and in accordance with fair dealing‟”]; see generally Asmus v. Pacific Bell (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1, 16 [employer‟s right to unilaterally modify employment agreement does not make agreement illusory]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 787-788 [contracting party with unilateral right to modify contract does not have “carte blanche to make any kind of change whatsoever”; unilateral right to modify, when limited by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, requires the party holding the power to affect the other party‟s rights to exercise it in a manner consistent with the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract].) Application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is no different in the arbitration context. In 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199 (24 Hour Fitness), a former employee brought an action against the company, doing business as 24 Hour Nautilus, for sexual harassment and related torts. The employer moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration policy in its employee handbook, which also contained a provision allowing the company to amend the handbook at its sole discretion. The 24 Hour Fitness court rejected the plaintiff‟s contention the unilateral right-to-amend provision made the arbitration agreement illusory and thus unconscionable. Observing the parties to an arbitration agreement, like any contract, are bound by the contract‟s implied covenant of good faith, the court explained, “Nautilus‟s discretionary power to modify the terms of the personnel handbook on [written] notice indisputably carries with it the duty to exercise that right fairly and in good faith. [Citation.] So construed, the modification provision does not render the contract illusory.” (Id. at p. 1214.)

Judges & Attorneys

Presiding Justice Perluss delivered the opinion for the court, with Associate Justices Woods and Jackson concurring.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Judge Ruth Ann Kwan.

Paul, Plevin, Sullivan & Connaughton, Fred M. Plevin, Jeffrey P. Ames and Matthew R. Jedreski for Defendants and Appellants, California Surety Investigations, Inc., Two Jinn, Inc., Aladdin Bail Bonds and Peter Holdsworth.

Stevens, Carlberg & McMillan and Daniel P. Stevens for Plaintiff and Respondent Valerie Serpa.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Apr 17 2013
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Arbitration

Second District Denies Arbitration: Holds That Plaintiff’s Allegations That All Defendants are Co-Agents Is Not Judicial Admission Because Defendant Sought to Reserve Argument on Same Issue

A Shack I Own In Eloy, Arizona // U Wouldn't W...

A Shack I Own In Eloy, Arizona // U Wouldn’t Wanna Live Here! (Photo credit: 666isMONEY ☮ ♥ & ☠)

On Monday, the Second District affirmed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.  Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler, et al., No. B237044, __ Cal.App.4th __ (2d Dist. Apr. 15, 2013).  Some defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the remaining defendants did not.  Slip Op. at 2.  The trial court denied on the grounds of waiver and the possibility of inconsistent rulings.

Moving defendants sought a reversal, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint alleged that all defendants are agents of one another, and that allegation is a binding judicial admission that gives the non-moving defendants the right to enforce the arbitration agreement.  They argued that the non-moving defendants were therefore not “third parties” to the arbitration agreement, within the meaning of C.C.P. section 1281.2(c), which provides that:

A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.

Id. (emphasis supplied).  The court noted that:

[N]ot every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission.  Otherwise, a plaintiff would conclusively establish the facts of the case by merely alleging them, and there would never be any disputed facts to be tried.  Rather, a judicial admission is ordinarily a factual allegation by one party that is admitted by the opposing party. The factual allegation is removed from the issues in the litigation because the parties agree as to its truth. Thus, facts to which adverse parties stipulate are judicially admitted. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hahn (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1238-1239.) Similarly, in discovery when a party propounds requests for admission, any facts admitted by the responding party constitute judicial admissions. (See, e.g., Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 978-979; Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410.) And when an answer admits certain factual allegations contained in a complaint or cross-complaint, those facts are likewise judicially admitted.2 (See, e.g., Valerio, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271.) A judicial admission is therefore conclusive both as to the admitting party and as to that party’s opponent. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 454, p. 587.) Thus, if a factual allegation is treated as a judicial admission, then neither party may attempt to contradict it—the admitted fact is effectively conceded by both sides.

Here, the moving defendants sought to reserve the right to argue at arbitration that the allegation of mutual agency was false, and thus it was not conceded by both sides.

Although the Kessler defendants frame their argument using the term “judicial admission” and rely on case law concerning judicial admissions, their counsel confirmed at oral argument that they do not in fact wish to treat Barsegian‟s allegation of mutual agency as a judicial admission, because the Kessler defendants do wish to be able to contest the truth of that allegation, either in court or before an arbitrator. That is, the Kessler defendants wish to hold Barsegian to the mutual agency allegation only for purposes of the motion to compel arbitration, but, should they succeed in compelling arbitration on the basis of that allegation, they wish to retain the right to prove to the arbitrator that the allegation is false. That is not how judicial admissions operate.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Apr 11 2013
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Arbitrability, Arbitration, Class-wide Arbitration, Concepcion

Ninth Circuit Compels Arbitration in Kilgore v. KeyBank, But Avoids Vitiating Broughton-Cruz Rule

English: Diamond Katana aircraft owned by Amer...

English: Diamond Katana aircraft owned by American School of Aviation, an FAA Part 141 flight school based in Atwater, California. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In a ruling that was expected to have a broad impact on mandatory employment arbitration agreements, the Ninth Circuit today compelled arbitration in Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association, but avoided a broad ruling vitiating the Broughton-Cruz rule.  Kilgore v. Keybank, National Association, No. 09-16703, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2013) (en banc).  The appeal involved a putative class action by former students of a failed flight-training school who seek broad injunctive relief against the bank that originated their student loans among others.  The en banc court held that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable under California law and reversed and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration.

Arbitration Clause

The Court quoted the relevant part of the arbitration clause as follows:

IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM, NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM . . . . FURTHER, I WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS PERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION. . . . I UNDERSTAND THAT OTHER RIGHTS I WOULD HAVE IF I WENT TO COURT MAY ALSO NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. . . .

Defendants sought a broad ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Concepcion vitiated the Broughton-Cruz rule that makes unenforceable arbitration agreements that bar certain claims for public injunctive relief.  The Ninth Circuit did not reach this question: Continue reading →

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Mar 28 2013
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Arbitration, Concepcion, Waiver

California Court of Appeal Validates Arbitration Agreement, Despite Class Waiver

albanian car dealer

albanian car dealer (Photo credit: gabork)

Yesterday, in an opinion with implications for employment arbitration agreements, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District reversed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.  See Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., et al., Case No. A134829, __ Cal.App.4th __ (1st Dist. Mar. 27, 2013).  The arbitration agreement related to the purchase of a used car on credit from defendants.  This opinion is notable for approving an arbitration agreement, despite the presence of a class waiver and the requirement to arbitration “public” claims.  Id. at 25-26.

The Court described the clause as follows:

The reverse side, also dense with text, contains a number of provisions in separate boxes, many dealing with typical ―boilerplate legal matters, such as warranties, applicable law, and buyer and seller remedies. None of the provisions on the back page requires a buyer‘s signature. Toward the bottom of the page is the arbitration clause. The entire text of the clause is outlined in a black border. In all capital letters and bold type at the top is written, ―ARBITRATION CLAUSE [¶] PLEASE REVIEW— IMPORTANT—AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS. Immediately below, three numbered provisions, also in all capital letters, inform the buyer either party may request arbitration, this would prevent a court or class-wide proceeding, and it might limit discovery. Below these, in smaller type, are the actual terms of the clause. Pursuant to these terms, the arbitration may be conducted under the auspices of the National Arbitration Forum or the American Arbitration Association (AAA), at the election of the buyer, or by any other mutually agreeable organization; the initial arbitration will be conducted by a single arbitrator; it will occur in the federal district of the buyer‘s residence; the seller must advance up to $2,500 of the buyer‘s arbitration costs; the award is binding unless it is $0 or more than $100,000 or includes injunctive relief, in which 4 case either party can request a second arbitration before three arbitrators; and the use of self-help remedies and small claims court is exempted.

The Court validated the presence of a class action waiver and requirement to arbitrate public claims, finding the arguments against each “foreclosed” by Concepcion:

Finally, Vasquez argues the waiver of class action rights and the requirement to arbitrate ―public claims, such as the statutory violations alleged here, are impermissible. (See Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 148 (Discover Bank); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303.) Both arguments have been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1740 (Concepcion), which found preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). (See Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 758, 769; Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 26 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1136–1137.) Although Concepcion expressly considered only Discover Bank‘s judicially created ban on class action waivers as unconscionable, the same rationale would require a finding of preemption of the statutory ban on class action waivers in section 1751, which is similarly based on public policy.

You can read more about the opinion here.

Judges & Attorneys

Justice Margulies wrote the opinion for the court, and Justices Dondero and Banke concurred.  The trial court judge was Hon. Robert S. Bowers of Solano County Superior Court

Toschi, Sidran, Collins & Doyle, David R. Sidran and Thomas M. Crowell for Defendants and Appellants.

Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner, Christopher P. Barry and Angela J. Smith for Plaintiff and Respondent.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Mar 25 2013
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Arbitration

Press Quotes About Analysis of Compton v. Superior Court

Armendariz: Besta Berri 2009 4906

Armendariz: Besta Berri 2009 4906 (Photo credit: dantzan)

The author’s analysis of the Compton v. Superior Court, No. B236669, — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 2013 WL 1120619 (2d Dist. Mar 19, 2013), was quoted in legal press today:

“In both cases, the First and Second districts applied Armendariz and invalidated arbitration agreements for lack of mutuality,” said Charles Jung, a Nassiri & Jung LLP attorney. “At least as far as California courts are concerned, Armendariz is alive and well, and it appears that this is going to continue to be the case until the California Supreme Court overrules it.”

In light of the latest ruling, plaintiffs and their attorneys looking to defeat mandatory arbitration agreements will keep an eagle eye out for any type of one-sidedness, according to Jung.

“The Compton ruling creates an avenue for employees to argue that mandatory agreements are unlawfully one-sided and that under Armendariz, they should be stricken,” he said. “For employers, it suggests the way to make arbitration agreements enforceable is by making them simple and even-handed. Employers can’t have their cake and eat it too.”

“The California Supreme Court really has its work cut out for it,” Jung said. “The challenge for the California Supreme Court is to try to preserve what it can of California’s public policy, yet not fall afoul of and directly contradict or simply ignore the U.S. Supreme Court. It’s a very tricky position for the court to be in.”

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Mar 20 2013
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Arbitration, Waiver

California Court of Appeal Reverses Arbitration Order in Wage Case, Citing Viability of Armendariz Bilateriality Rule

English: own work

English: own work (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Yesterday, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District reversed the lower court’s order granting a petition to compel arbitration in a putative wage & hour class action.  Compton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. B236669, — Cal.Rptr.3d —-, 2013 WL 1120619 (2d Dist. Mar 19, 2013).  Plaintiff was a property manager who was required to sign an arbitration agreement that also barred arbitration of class claims.  The trial court granted defendants’ petition to compel arbitration.

Normally an order compelling arbitration is not appealable.  But the Court of Appeal determined it had jurisdiction, citing the “death knell” doctrine:

An order compelling arbitration is not appealable. (Elijahjuan v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 15, 19.) The parties argue over whether this matter is appealable under the “death knell” doctrine, which applies when an order effectively terminates a class action. Rather than parse the case law on that issue, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to treat this nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate in this unusual case because: (1) the unconscionability issue is one of law based on undisputed facts and has been fully briefed; (2) the record is sufficient to consider the issue and it appears that the trial court would be only a nominal party; (3) if we were to dismiss the appeal, and the ultimate reversal of the order is inevitable, it would come in a post-arbitration award after the substantial time and expense of arbitrating the dispute; and (4) as a result, dismissing the appeal would require the parties to arbitrate nonarbitrable claims and would be costly and dilatory.

The Court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unconscionably one-sided because (1) it exempted from arbitration claims the employer would more likely bring, such as claims for injunctive or equitable relief from trade secret disclosures; (2) it limited the time to demand arbitration to a period shorter than the relevant statutes of limitation; (3) it retained the statute of limitations period for itself  and (4) it suggested that the arbitrator had the discretion not to award mandatory attorney’s fees under the Labor Code.

The Court determined that it was not violating Concepcion by enforcing Armendariz’s bilaterality rule: Continue reading →

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Mar 19 2013
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Arbitration, Class Actions

California Court of Appeal for the First District Invalidates Arbitration Agreement Citing Lack of Mutuality

albanian car dealer

albanian car dealer (Photo credit: gabork)

In a ruling with implications for employment class action litigants, the California Court of Appeal struck down an arbitration agreement by a defendant in a putative class action, rejecting an argument that an unconscionability analysis that focuses on the lack of mutuality in an arbitration contract violates Concepcion. Natalini v. Import Motor, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 4th 587 (1st Dist., mod. February 5, 2013).

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,  563 U.S. –––– , 131 S.Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011), appellant car dealer argued that an “unconscionability analysis that focuses on the lack of mutuality or bilaterality in an arbitration provision is ‘an example of applying a generally applicable contract defense in a manner which disfavors arbitration.'”  The First District declined to read Concepcion so broadly, and noted that:

Recent California and federal district court decisions addressing arbitration provisions very similar to that in the present case and in the identical car purchase context have not read  Concepcion so broadly.  (See  Trompeter v. Ally Financial, Inc. (N.D.Cal., June 1, 2012, No. C–12–00392 CW) 2012 WL 1980894 [p. *8] [nonpub. opn.]  ( Trompeter );   Smith v. Americredit Financial Services, Inc. (S.D.Cal., Mar. 12, 2012, No. 09cv1076 DMS (BLM)) 2012 WL 834784 [pp. *2–*4] ( Smith );   Lau v. Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (N.D.Cal., Jan. 31, 2012, No. CV 11–1940 MEJ) 2012 WL 370557 [pp. *6–*7] ( Lau );  see also  Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 804, fn. 18, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 773.)   Continue reading →

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