On Monday, the Second District affirmed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler, et al., No. B237044, __ Cal.App.4th __ (2d Dist. Apr. 15, 2013). Some defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the remaining defendants did not. Slip Op. at 2. The trial court denied on the grounds of waiver and the possibility of inconsistent rulings.
Moving defendants sought a reversal, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint alleged that all defendants are agents of one another, and that allegation is a binding judicial admission that gives the non-moving defendants the right to enforce the arbitration agreement. They argued that the non-moving defendants were therefore not “third parties” to the arbitration agreement, within the meaning of C.C.P. section 1281.2(c), which provides that:
A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.
Id. (emphasis supplied). The court noted that:
[N]ot every factual allegation in a complaint automatically constitutes a judicial admission. Otherwise, a plaintiff would conclusively establish the facts of the case by merely alleging them, and there would never be any disputed facts to be tried. Rather, a judicial admission is ordinarily a factual allegation by one party that is admitted by the opposing party. The factual allegation is removed from the issues in the litigation because the parties agree as to its truth. Thus, facts to which adverse parties stipulate are judicially admitted. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hahn (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1236, 1238-1239.) Similarly, in discovery when a party propounds requests for admission, any facts admitted by the responding party constitute judicial admissions. (See, e.g., Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 978-979; Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410.) And when an answer admits certain factual allegations contained in a complaint or cross-complaint, those facts are likewise judicially admitted.2 (See, e.g., Valerio, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1271.) A judicial admission is therefore conclusive both as to the admitting party and as to that party’s opponent. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 454, p. 587.) Thus, if a factual allegation is treated as a judicial admission, then neither party may attempt to contradict it—the admitted fact is effectively conceded by both sides.
Here, the moving defendants sought to reserve the right to argue at arbitration that the allegation of mutual agency was false, and thus it was not conceded by both sides.
Although the Kessler defendants frame their argument using the term “judicial admission” and rely on case law concerning judicial admissions, their counsel confirmed at oral argument that they do not in fact wish to treat Barsegian‟s allegation of mutual agency as a judicial admission, because the Kessler defendants do wish to be able to contest the truth of that allegation, either in court or before an arbitrator. That is, the Kessler defendants wish to hold Barsegian to the mutual agency allegation only for purposes of the motion to compel arbitration, but, should they succeed in compelling arbitration on the basis of that allegation, they wish to retain the right to prove to the arbitrator that the allegation is false. That is not how judicial admissions operate.