Morrison & Foerster Wins $9.36 Million in Compensatory Damages and $1.525 Million in Punitive Damages in Trade Secrets Trial

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A San Francisco Superior Court jury granted $1.525 million in punitive damages Friday to Technology Information Group, adding to the $9.36 million in compensatory damages it awarded to the company a day earlier in a trade secrets dispute with its former employees and a competitor. As reported in law360.com, the “jury found San Francisco-based FusionStorm, three of its executive officers and three former TIG employees who were hired by FusionStorm liable for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of loyalty, misappropriation of trade secrets and other causes of action . . . .”

The complaint alleged that the improper conduct began while the former employees still worked at TIG’s Tampa, Fla., offices. The former employees were accused of trying to lure away other of TIG’s employees and customers to FusionStorm, which was then setting up in the area. TIG filed its lawsuit in 2007 and won a temporary restraining order that enjoined FusionStorm from soliciting additional TIG employees and from conducting business with certain customers, MoFo said.

The jury verdict comes after a five-week trial.  FusionStorm was represented by Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.  TIG was represented by Morrison & Foerster LLP.  The docket may be viewed here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Central District Remands Class Action Based on Local Controversy Exception to CAFA

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In Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., No. CV 10-2242 ABC (AJWx), — F. Supp. 2d —-, 2010 WL 3156850 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2010) a wage and hour plaintiff brought a motion to remand, after the case was removed pursuant to CAFA.  The Court granted Plaintiff’s remand motion.

While Defendants have demonstrated that more than $5,000,000 is in controversy under CAFA, Plaintiff has demonstrated that CAFA’s Local Controversy exception applies in this case. Therefore, the Court must decline to exercise jurisdiction. See Serrano, 478 F .3d at 1022. Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED and this case is REMANDED to Los Angeles Superior Court.

Plaintiffs were represented by Mark P. Estrella, Miriam L. Schimmel, Robert E. Byrnes, Sue Jin Kim of Initiative Legal Group APC and Payam Shahian of Strategic Legal Practices APC.

Defendants were represented by David L. Terry, David L. Woodard of Poyner Spruill LLP and Sarah N. Drechsler and Timothy M. Freudenberger of Carlton Disante & Freudenberger LLP.

The judge is Hon. Audrey B. Collins.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Northern District Approves $4.5 Million Settlement Against RadioShack in Expense Reimbursement Case, With $1.5 Million in Fees, and $5,000 Incentive Payments to Each Lead Plaintiff

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Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen (whose confirmation to the Northern District of California bench has unfortunately been stalled for far too long) approved the class settlement and attorney fee application in Stuart v. RadioShack Corp., 2010 WL 3155645, No. C-07-4499 EMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010).

This class action was initiated in state court in June 2007, alleging that RadioShack had improperly failed to reimburse its employees for expenses they incurred in using their personal vehicles to perform inter-company transfers (“ICSTs”). Plaintiffs claimed for reimbursement pursuant to California Labor Code § 2802 and for a violation of California Business & Professions Code.  Subsequently Plaintiffs added a claim for recovery of penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).  The case was removed in August 2007. And in February 2009, Judge Chen granted the motion for class certification, certifying a class consisting of “all persons employed by RadioShack within the State of California, at any time from June 3, 2003, to the present, who drove their personal vehicles to and from RadioShack stores to carry out ICSTs and who were not reimbursed for mileage.”  On October 1, 2009–nine days before trial was scheduled to begin–the parties reached a settlement.

Under the Settlement Agreement, RadioShack will pay a total of $4.5 million for the release by the class, as an all-inclusive sum (proceeds to be distributed to the class, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, costs of claim administration, incentive payments to the class representatives, and the PAGA award to the state), without reversion of any of the $4.5 million to RadioShack.

After attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, costs of claim administration, incentive payments, and the PAGA award to the state have been deducted from the $4.5 million, the remainder for distribution to the class members and/or donation to charity is $2,796,563.31.

Each class member’s award “depends on the number of weeks that the class member worked.”

The Court found that, importantly, “the amount available to the class after deductions for, e.g., fees and costs–i.e., $2,796,563.31–is not far off what the class might be awarded if it were to prevail on the merits after a trial.” Id. *4.

Plaintiffs’ counsel asked for an award of $1.5 million  (i.e., one-third of the total settlement amount), plus litigation expenses which total $78,436.69.

The Court has reviewed the expenses and determined that they are reasonable. The Court notes that the sum is not excessive given that this litigation has been ongoing for more than three years.

Attorneys Fees Application

The attorneys presented a fee application claiming $1.5 million as a lodestar for fees–excluding work performed in preparing for final approval and any post-judgment work that may be needed.  The $1.5 million sum represents 2,116.69 hours of work over a period of more than three years, at hourly rates of the billing attorneys ranging from $600 to $1,000.

After reviewing the billing records submitted by counsel as well as the declarations regarding the hourly rates of counsel, the court found that the number of hours was reasonable given the length of the lawsuit and the vigorous disputes over the course of the litigation (e.g., regarding RadioShack’s defense that it had no duty to reimburse until an employee made a request for reimbursement).

The court did express some “concerns about the $1,000 hourly rate” claimed by one of the attorneys.  “Based on the Court’s experience, this is an inordinately large hourly rate, even if the Court were to assume that [the attorney] has fifty years of experience.”  But the Court concluded that “given the 2,116.69 hours incurred, the average hourly rate for a fee award of $1.5 million total is $708, an amount that the Court deems appropriate, particularly when no multiplier is being sought on top of the lodestar.”

Compared to the percentage of the fund, the court noted that “the total settlement amount to be paid by RadioShack (with no possibility of reversion), the fee award represents one-third of the settlement amount.”  The court found that this was “well within the range of percentages which courts have upheld as reasonable in other class action lawsuits.”

The court also approved an incentive award of $5,000 for each of the two class representatives, for a total of $10,000.  The Court concluded that the incentive payments were appropriate and reasonable.  “Although the class representatives did not enter this litigation until late in the proceedings, due consideration must be given to the fact that they were willing and ready to go to trial.”  The court noted that if the “class representatives had asked for a larger sum, the Court might well have reached a different conclusion, but the $5,000 sought for each representative was viewed as “relatively modest.”

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Southern District of California Denies Remand in Case Asserting CAFA Jurisdiction

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In Johnson v. U.S. Vision, Inc., No. 10-CV-0690 BEN (CAB), 2010 WL 3154847 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) the Southern District of California faced a remand motion in a wage and hour case that had been removed pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1453.

Judge Roger T. Benitez denied the motion to remand.  Defendant presented a calculation of damages, supporting its calcualtions with declaration from, among other people, the Assistant Controller, Operations, for U.S. Vision, Inc., responsible for enforcing Defendants’ payroll policies and procedures.  The declaration set forth Plaintiff’s most recent hourly rate of pay, as well as the specific number of optical managers and optechs employed during the Class Period, average hourly rates of pay for managers and optechs, number of employees who separated their employment with Defendants, and number of possible wage statements for each employee per year.

Plaintiff argued that Defendants miscalculated the amount in controversy because:

Defendants erroneously assumed “each class member was damaged to the same extent that Plaintiff Johnson was, and that every putative class member, among other things, worked off the clock and incurred a break violation every single day of the entire class period.” Mot. 6. Plaintiff emphasizes that Defendants have access to more specific figures to calculate the amount in controversy and that “each [class] member can be identified using information contained in Defendants’ payroll, scheduling and personnel records.” Compl. ¶ 39.

But the Court held that absent a “persuasive argument that Defendants are required to prove actual damages in order to remove this action, however, the Court must consider the amount put in controversy by the Complaint, not the ultimate or provable amount of damages.”  (citing Rippee v. Boston Market Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (S.D. Cal. 2005).)  The Court found that, having based their calculations on allegations provided in the Complaint, Defendants proved with a legal certainty that CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold is satisfied.

Despite Plaintiff’s attempt to provide supplemental information in the motion to remand, Defendants were entitled to, and did, use the factual allegations in the Complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant must use specific factual allegations or provisions in the complaint to support its argument of proper removal). The Court finds that Defendants provided detailed and competent evidence supporting their calculations and showing, to a legal certainty, that the jurisdictional threshold under CAFA is met. To the extent subsequent events show that jurisdiction would not be proper, the Court can address remand at that time. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Obama Administration Weighs in on Pharmaceutical Representatives Case, Arguing that Reps Are Not Exempt

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Following its stated policy of aggressively prosecuting wage and hour violations, the  Obama administration‘s Department of Labor has filed an amicus brief in the Ninth Circuit case of Buchanan v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 10-1525, arguing that pharmaceutical representatives are not exempt under the outside sales exemption or the administrative exemption of the FLSA.  You can read more here.

The Second Circuit considered the same issue and found that reps were not exempt under either the outside sales exemption nor the administrative exemption.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Crocs Settles Trade Secrets Misappropriation Suit Brought by Columbia Sportswear

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Columbia Sportswear settled a trade-secrets lawsuit against Crocs.  The suit stemmed from Crocs’s hiring a Columbia employee as an independent contractor.  Columbia alleged claims of misappropriation of trade secrets, intentional interference with contract, and aiding and abetting the employee’s breach of his duty of loyalty to Columbia.  Read a report from the Denver Post here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Judge Walker Lifts Stay

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Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the Northern District of California today lifted a stay on his decision where he ruled that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.  Judge Walker, however, delayed implementation of the order to lift his stay until August 18.

Defendant-intervenors Dennis Hollingsworth, Gail Knight, Martin Gutierrez, Mark Jansson and ProtectMarriage.com brought a motion to stay the court’s judgment last week to ensure that Proposition 8 remains in effect as they pursue their appeal in the Ninth Circuit. In the alternative, proponents sought a brief stay to allow the court of appeals to consider the matter.

San Francisco asked the court to deny the stay and order the injunction against Proposition 8 to take effect immediately. California’s Governor and Attorney General also opposed any stay.

The Court held that “[b]ecause proponents fail to satisfy any of the factors necessary to warrant a stay, the court denies a stay except for a limited time solely in order to permit the court of appeals to consider the issue in an orderly manner.”

Federal courts look to four factors in deciding whether a stay is appropriate:

(1) whether proponents have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits;

(2) whether proponents will be irreparably injured absent a stay;

(3) whether the stay will substantially injure other interested parties; and

(4) whether the stay is in the public interest.

See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. —-, 129, S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (noting overlap with Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. —-, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008)).  The first two factors “are the most critical.”  Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757.

The order reads:

None of the factors the court weighs in considering a motion to stay favors granting a stay. Accordingly, proponents’ motion for a stay is DENIED. Doc #705. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment forthwith. That judgment shall be STAYED until August 18, 2010 at 5 PM PDT at which time defendants and all persons under their control or supervision shall cease to apply or enforce Proposition 8.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Labor Department Has Hired 250 New Wage-and-Hour Investigators, Representing a Staff Increase of One-Third

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As reported by Robert Pear of the New York Times yesterday, the Department of Labor has bulked up its staffing of wage and hour   investigators by one-third, or 250 investigators.  Mr. Pear reports that the Obama administration is paying particular attention to the pay practices in the healthcare industry “after finding that many hospitals and nursing homes do not pay proper overtime to nurses and other employees who work more than 40 hours a week.”

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Evidence of Possession of Alleged Trade Secret and Ability to Bring Devices to Market Faster Than Claimant Sufficient to State Claim

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In Aqua-Lung America, Inc. v. American Underwater Products, Inc., 2010 WL 2991512 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2010) (slip op.), plaintiff moved for reconisderation of an order denying summary judgment on trade secret misappropriation claim for trade secret misappropriation.  Judge Richard Seeborg of the Northern District of California held that relying on evidence from an economic expert, joined with evidence that plaintiff was in possession of the alleged trade secrets and that it was able to bring its devices to market in advance of defendants, allows sufficient inferences to support the existence of triable issues of fact as to the trade secrets claim.  The court denied reconsideration.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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One Year Statute of Limitations Applies to Waiting Time Penalty Claim Where Wages Not Sought

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Hon. Howard R. Lloyd today issued an unpublished opinion today confirming that a one year statute of limitations pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a) applies to a plaintiff’s claim for waiting time penalties.  Pinheiro v. ACXIOM Information Security Services, Inc., 2010 WL 3058081 (N.D. Cal. August 03, 2010) (Slip Op.)

Plaintiff argued that a three year statute of limiations applied, citing Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal.4th 163, 999 P.2d 706, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 (2000), in which the plaintiff sought both unpaid wages and waiting time penalties.  The court rejected this argument and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim without leave to amend.

Plaintiff Carla Pinheiro was an employee of defendant Aerotek, Inc. (Aerotek), an employment agency. She alleges that she was assigned to work as a temporary customer service representative for defendant Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc. (Quest). The gravamen of Pinheiro’s complaint as to Aerotek is that Aerotek wrongfully terminated her employment (Sixth Claim for Relief) and failed to timely pay her final wages in violation of California Labor Code sections 201-203 (Seventh Claim for Relief). Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Aerotek under California Bus. & Prof.Code section 17200 (Eighth Claim for Relief) based upon the alleged failure to timely pay her final wages.

Aerotek moved to dismiss Pinheiro’s seventh and eighth claims for relief concerning the alleged failure to timely pay her final wages.

The Court found that, based upon the law as it currently stands, plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims for relief as to Aerotek should be dismissed.

Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203 COA

At issue was whether Pinheiro’s claim for waiting time penalties is subject to a one-year statute of limitations (Aerotek’s view) or to a three-year limitations period (Pinheiro’s position). The court held that the one-year statute of limitations under Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a) applies, and plaintiff’s seventh claim for relief therefore is time-barred. See McCoy v.Super. Ct., 157 Cal.App.4th 225, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 483 (2008) (holding that in action seeking only waiting time penalties, and not wages, the one-year statute of limitations under Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 340(a) applies). Cf. Ross v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Case No. C07-02951 SI, 2008 WL 4447713 *4 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2008) (concluding that the three-year statute of limitations period under Cal. Labor Code § 203 applied where plaintiff sought unpaid wages, as well as waiting time penalties). Plaintiff’s cited authority, Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co., 23 Cal.4th 163, 999 P.2d 706, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 518 (2000), in which the plaintiff sought both unpaid wages and waiting time penalties, but the Court held that this “does not compel a contrary conclusion.”

Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200 COA

The court held that remedies under California Labor Code § 203 are penalties, and not restitution, and therefore cannot be recovered under the UCL. In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F.Supp.2d 609, 619 (N.D. Cal.2007); Tomlinson v. Indymac Bank, F.S.B., 359 F.Supp.2d 891, 895 (C.D. Cal.2005).  The court dismissed the 17200 claim as to Aerotek without leave to amend.

Alison Marie Miceli, Michael James Grace, and Graham Stephen Paul Hollis for Plaintiff.

Jonathan Morris Brenner, Caroline McIntyre, and Alison P. Danaceau for Defendants

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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