Tag Archives: Labor Code section 203

Collective Bargaining Agreement’s Waiver of California Labor Code Section 227.3 Right to Vacation Pay Upon Termination Must Be Clear and Unmistakable

Take a Vacation!

Take a Vacation! (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Second District held today that the collective-bargaining exception to Labor Code section 227.3 requires that the right to immediate payment of vested vacation time is waived only if the CBA “clearly and unmistakably waives that right”.  Choate v. Celite Corporation, No. B239160, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (2d Dist. May 2, 2013).

The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the trial court’s ruling that defendant willfully refused to pay vacation time.  Labor Code section 203 allows for waiting time penalties of up to 30 days’ wages if an employer willfully fails to pay the employee any outstanding wages upon termination:

203. (a) If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. . . .

(Emphasis supplied.)  But because the present case was the first to define the standard for waiver under section 227.3, the Court found defendant did not act unreasonably.

The trial court’s ruling that Celite acted willfully was based in part on the premise that Celite’s misunderstanding of the law governing waiver—even though shared by the Union—was unreasonable. This premise necessarily assumes that section 227.3 requires any waiver to be clear and unmistakable. Although we agree with the trial court that this is the appropriate standard, this is the first case to define the standard for waiver under section 227.3. Plaintiffs argue that Saustez decided this issue, but it did not. (Saustez, supra, 31 Cal.3d 774.) Celite’s good faith reliance on a different waiver standard was accordingly reasonable, particularly in light of the language in Firestone supporting that standard. (Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 325-326 [position taken where law is undecided can be reasonable].) That Celite’s position did not prevail does not mean that its position was unreasonable. (8 Cal. Code Regs., § 13520.)

You can read more here.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Employers Must Pay Piece Rate Workers Separate Hourly Compensation, Even Where Employer Maintains Minimum Wage Floor

Mercedes-Benz Motor Shop

Mercedes-Benz Motor Shop (Photo credit: Visionstyler Press)

The Second District published today Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, et al., Case No. B235292, __ Cal. App. 4th __ (2d Dist. Mar. 6, 2013).  Gonzalez is a wage and hour class action where the question presented was whether California’s minimum wage law requires an employer that compensates its automotive service technicians on a “piece-rate” basis for repair work must also pay those technicians a separate hourly minimum wage for time spent during their work shifts waiting for vehicles to repair or performing other non-repair tasks directed by the employer.  Defendant automobile dealership contended it was not required to pay the technicians a separate hourly minimum wage for such time because it ensured that a technician’s total compensation for a pay period never fell below what the employer refers to as the “minimum wage floor” — the total number of hours the technician was at work during the pay period (including hours spent waiting for repair work or performing non-repair tasks), multiplied by the applicable minimum wage rate.  The employer supplemented pay, if necessary, to cover any shortfall.

The Court of Appeal concluded that class members were entitled to separate hourly compensation for time spent waiting for repair work or performing other non-repair tasks directed by the employer during their work shifts, as well as penalties under Labor Code section 203, subdivision (a).  You can read more about the Gonzalez opinion here.

Judges and Attorneys

Associate Justice Victoria M. Chavez wrote the opinion for the court, with Presiding Justice Roger W. Boren and Associate Justice Judith Ashmann-Gerst concurring.  Appeal was taken from a judgment of Hon. Mary H. Strobel of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Dickstein Shapiro, Arthur F. Silbergeld and Jennifer A. Awrey; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow, Cynthia E. Tobisman, and Alana H. Rotter for Defendants and Appellants.

Gartenberg Gelfand Hayton & Selden and Aaron C. Gundzik; Law Offices of Neal J. Fialkow and Neal J. Fialkow for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Curiale Hirschfeld Kraemer LLP and Felicia R. Reid for National Automobile Dealers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Nossaman LLP and John T. Kennedy for California Automotive Business Coalition as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Fine, Boggs & Perkins LLP, John P. Boggs and David J. Reese for California New Car Dealers Association and Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.

Altshuler Berzon LLP, Eve H. Cervantez and Eileen B. Goldsmith for California Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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