Tag Archives: California

Cal. Supreme Court Issues Opinion in Reid v. Google, Rejecting Strict Application of Stray Remarks Doctrine in Cal. Discrimination Cases

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The California Supreme Court today issued its decision in Reid v. Google.  The Court rejected strict application of the stray remarks doctrine in California discrimination cases.  Under this doctrine, statements that non-decision-makers make or that decision makers make outside of the decisional process are deemed stray, and they are irrelevant and insufficient to avoid summary judgment.

Plaintiff Brian Reid filed an age discrimination lawsuit against his former employer, Google, Inc. The trial judge, Hon. William J. Elfving, granted Google‘s summary judgment motion relating to plaintiff‘s claims. The Court of Appeal reversed.

The Court decided two issues:

  1. Does a trial court‘s failure to rule on a party‘s evidentiary objections relating to a summary judgment motion waive the objections on appeal?
  2. Should California courts follow the federal courts in adopting the stray remarks doctrine in employment discrimination cases?

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court’s failure to issue express rulings on evidentiary objections did not waive those objections on appeal.  And the Court of Appeal further refused to apply the stray remarks doctrine to exclude alleged discriminatory statements that Reid‘s supervisors and coworkers made.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusions:

Regarding the waiver issue, the Court of Appeal correctly determined that a finding of waiver does not depend on whether a trial court rules expressly on evidentiary objections and that Google‘s filing of written evidentiary objections before the summary judgment hearing preserved them on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(5), (d).)  After a party objects to evidence, the trial court must then rule on those objections. If the trial court fails to rule after a party has properly objected, the evidentiary objections are not deemed waived on appeal.

Regarding the stray remarks issue, the Court of Appeal also correctly determined that application of the stray remarks doctrine is unnecessary and its categorical exclusion of evidence might lead to unfair results.

Robin Weideman of the California Labor & Employment Law Blog gives a nice analysis of the stray remarks portion of today’s ruling.

The attorneys for plaintiff and appellant were Barry L. Bunshoft, Ray L. Wong, Paul J. Killion, Lorraine P. Ocheltree, Eden E. Anderson and Allegra A. Jones.  Charlotte E. Fishman for California Employment Lawyers Association filed an Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.  Thomas W. Osborne, Melvin Radowitz and Barbara A. Jones for AARP also filed an Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

The attorneys for defendant and respondent were Fred W. Alvarez, Marina C. Tsatalis, Amy K. Todd, Marvin Dunson III, Koray J. Bulut, Elizabeth C. Tippett, Jeanna Steele, Gary M. Gansle of Wilson Sonsini and Paul W. Cane, Jr. of Paul Hastings.  Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and Robert A. Olson for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel filed an Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.  Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe‘s Gary S. Siniscalco, Patricia K. Gillette, Greg J. Richardson and Lynne C. Hermle on behalf of the Employers Group and California Employment Law Council also filed an Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. Jonathan B. Steiner, Jay-Allen Eisen, Jon B. Eisenberg, Dennis A. Fischer, Steven L. Mayer, Robert A. Olson, Douglas R. Young, and Robin Meadow also filed an Amicus Curiae.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Central District Approves $4,385,000 and 30% Attorney Fee Award in Class Settlement of Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc.

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Judge Avern Cohn of the Central District of California approved a wage and hour class settlement in Cicero v. DirecTV, Inc., 2010 WL 2991486 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (not reported).  Judge Cohn approved a payout fund to class members of $4,385,000, a 30% attorney fee award of $1,950,000 to class counsel, and incentive awards of $7,500 and $5,000 the representative plaintiffs.

The class action claimed violations of California’s wage and hour laws.  The named plaintiffs are former satellite television installation and service technicians who brought this case individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated current and former satellite installation and/or service technicians against their former employers Mountain Center, Inc., and Ironwood Communications Inc. (currently DirecTV, Inc. doing business as DirecTV Home Services, collectively “Defendant”) for allegedly violating California’s labor and unfair competition laws. Named Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant violated applicable provisions of the Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“the IWC”) Wage Orders, the Labor Code, and the Business and Professions Code by: (1) failing to provide employees duty-free meal periods; (2) failing to reimburse employees for tools necessary to the performance of the employees’ work; (3) failing to pay wages for all hours worked, including hours worked in excess of eight per day and forty per week; (4) failing to pay all wages owed employees upon termination of the employment relationship; and (5) failing to provide accurate wage statements.

The parties engaged in two mediations of the matter before the Hon. William Cahill (Ret.) in March, 2009, and subsequently before the Hon. Diane Wayne (Ret.).

The Court approved the attorneys’ fees request, which represented 30% of the total gross settlement amount.  The Court noted that:

California recognizes the common fund doctrine for the award of attorneys’ fees. Under California and Ninth Circuit precedent, a court has discretion to calculate and award attorneys’ fees using either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method. Wersha v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal.App. 4th 224, 253 (2001); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir.2002). The Court, in its discretion, finds that the percentage method is a fair, reasonable, and appropriate method for awarding attorneys’ fees in this case. . . .

Overall, although this percentage is slightly higher than the 25% benchmark for fees in class action cases, it is consistent with other wage and hour class actions where the recovery is less than $10 million. Moreover, there have been no objections to the amount of attorneys’ fees. The Court therefore finds that the amount of attorneys’ fees is warranted by the complexity of the case and Class Counsel’s dedication of extraordinary time and resources to the prosecution of this claim.

Id. **6-7.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Second District Court of Appeal Holds That “in the vast majority of wage and hour disputes, class suitability should not be determined on demurrer.”

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This next case highlights the difficulty of successfully eliminating a wage and hour class action in California at the demurrer stage.  After 3 bites at the apple, the trial judge in Gutierrez v. California Commerce Club, Inc., 2010 WL 2991875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. August 02, 2010) (not reported) sustained without leave to amend the defendant California Commerce Club, Inc.’s (“Club”)  demurrer to plaintiff’s third amended complaint on the ground the plaintiffs had failed to show the existence of a class, and dismissed the action as to all representative claims.  In a 3-0 opinion, Justice Jeffrey J. Johnson, writing for the Second District Court of Appeal, reversed the trial court’s order.

Putative class representatives Sergio Gutierrez and Hector Salazar filed the operative third amended class action complaint against the Club, alleging, among other things, that they and other similarly situated members of the putative class were injured by the Club’s unlawful policy and practice of denying meal and rest breaks to certain hourly, non-union employees.

The Court of Appeal held that “In this action, as in the vast majority of wage and hour disputes, class suitability should not be determined on demurrer.”

Plaintiffs alleged that, pursuant to a Club policy or practice, they and similarly situated hourly, non-union employees have been denied meal and rest breaks to which they are legally entitled, or compensation therefor.  The Court reasoned that “[o]n these allegations, it is clear that the Club liability, if any, to the class as a whole, can be determined by reviewing a single or set of facts common to all.” Id. *6.  The Court wrote:

We return again to and rely upon the well-established principle, that “only in mass tort actions (or other actions equally unsuited to class action treatment) [should] class suitability … be determined at the pleading stage. In other cases, particularly those involving wage and hour claims, [such as the instant action,] class suitability should not be determined by demurrer.” ( Prince, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1325, italics added; see also Tarkington, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512.).  Id.

We will reverse the order dismissing the action following the sustaining without leave to amend of the demurrer to the TAC based on the trial court’s finding that the pleading failed “to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of a class.” It was premature for the trial court to make determinations pertaining to class suitability on demurrer. The allegations of the operative complaint are sufficient to move the action beyond the pleading stage.

Id. *6.

The appeal was taken from an order of Judge Aurelio Munoz of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. (Judge Munoz is a retired judge of the L.A. Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.).  Matthew J. Matern and Thomas S. Campbell appeared for Plaintiffs and Appellants.  Anna Segobia Master and Jennifer Rappoport appeared for Defendant and Respondent.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Judge Vaughn Walker Strikes Down Proposition 8

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Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the Northern District of California issued his much anticipated ruling today in Perry, et al. v. Shwarzenegger, et al., Case No. C09-2292 VRW.  Judge Walker struck down the so-called gay marriage ban, Proposition 8, concluding that “Plaintiffs have demonstrated by overwhelming evidence that Proposition 8 violates their due process and equal protection rights and that they will continue to suffer these constitutional violations until state officials cease enforcement of Proposition 8.”   The case involved a challenge to the November 2008 voter-enacted amendment to the California Constitution (“Proposition 8” or “Prop 8”).  Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7.5.

The Court concluded that:

Proposition 8 fails to advance any rational basis in singling out gay men and lesbians for denial of a marriage license. Indeed, the evidence shows Proposition 8 does nothing more than enshrine in the California Constitution the notion that opposite-sex couples are superior to same-sex couples.Because California has no interest in discriminating against gay men and lesbians, and because Proposition 8 prevents California from fulfilling its constitutional obligation to provide marriages on an equal basis, the court concludes that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated by overwhelming evidence that Proposition 8 violates their due process and equal protection rights and that they will continue to suffer these constitutional violations until state officials cease enforcement of Proposition 8. California is able to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, as it has already issued 18,000 marriage licenses to same-sex couples and has not suffered any demonstrated harm as a result, see FF 64-66; moreover, California officials have chosen not to defend Proposition 8 in these proceedings.

The Court ordered the following:

Because Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the court orders entry of judgment permanently enjoining its enforcement; prohibiting the official defendants from applying or enforcing Proposition 8 and directing the official defendants that all persons under their control or supervision shall not apply or enforce Proposition 8. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment without bond in favor of plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors and against defendants and defendant-intervenors pursuant to FRCP 58.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Gov. Schwarzenegger Vetoes Agricultural Employees Overtime Bill

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Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill Wednesday that would have made California’s hourly agricultural employees the only farmworkers in the nation to receive overtime pay after 40 hours a week or eight hours a day.  As reported in the San Francisco Chronicle:

In vetoing the measure, Schwarzenegger cited the fragile economy and said that extending overtime protections could put farms out of business, or result in lower paychecks for agricultural workers because farmers would hire more people and cut hours to avoid paying overtime.

The bill’s author, Sen. Dean Florez, D-Shafter (Kern County), blasted the veto. In a statement released by his office, Florez said the Republican governor sided “with a labor practice derived from the segregationist South,” and that the veto means it is “acceptable to treat one class of people differently from all others.”

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Sixth District Reverses Grant of Summary Adjudication of UTSA Claim on Equitable Estoppel Grounds

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In Insyst Ltd. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 2010 WL 2892712 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2010) (unpublished), the California Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication of plaintiff’s misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action. The trial court granted summary adjudication based on the lapse of the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal reversed on equitable estoppel grounds. Defendant “effectively concedes that in its motion it presented no evidence of plaintiff’s conduct after December 2002 apart from the filing of the complaint on July 30, 2004. Instead, in its reply defendant simply challenged plaintiff to present evidence of its diligence, arguing that plaintiff made no showing of diligence. This is not how a party should be able to obtain a summary adjudication.”
By CHARLES H. JUNG

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S.D. California Certifies 23(b)(3) Class of Newspaper Home Delivery Carriers

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In another case involving an employer’s attempt to contract around a putative employer/employee relationship, the Southern District of California certified a 23(b)(3) class of newspaper home delivery carriers. Dalton v. Lee Publications, Inc., 2010 WL 2985130 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (slip op.).
Defendant Lee Publications, doing business as North County Times (“NCT”), operates the North County Times, a newspaper of general circulation in the San Diego area. Plaintiffs are current and former home-delivery newspaper carriers for NCT.
The class was defined as “[a]ll persons presently and formerly engaged as newspaper home delivery carriers by LEE PUBLICATIONS, INC. and for the North County Times newspaper in the State of California during the period from and including April 18, 2004, through and including the date of trial set for this action, and who, as a condition of such engagement, signed a written agreement for the home delivery of newspapers, which categorized them as independent contractors and not employees.” Id. at *1, n.1.
Each class member has signed contracts with NCT that contained provisions regarding the carriers’ primary duties, rate of pay, liabilities, penalties, and expense reimbursement, among other things. All the contracts stated that the carrier “is an independent contractor, is not an employee or agent of the Company, and is not subject to the Company’s direction or control.” And either party may terminate the contract without cause with thirty-days notice, or for cause without notice. The Court examines the contracts in more detail below.
The Court described the Plaintiff’s Tasks as follows:

Plaintiffs deliver the North County Times to the homes of subscribers. Each morning, the newspaper carriers arrive at one of several distribution centers in San Diego County. The carriers arrive at different times. Although they generally arrive between 1:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., some arrive earlier or later. The arrival time varies depending on the day of the week.
The carriers are contractually obligated to deliver the assembled newspapers by 6:00 a.m. each weekday and 7:00 a.m. on Saturday and Sunday.
Upon arrival, the carriers are responsible for assembling the newspapers. Some assemble the papers at the distribution center-those that use the distribution center pay a rental fee-and others assemble the papers elsewhere. Assembling the newspapers may involve folding or inserting the following: newspaper inserts, sections, pre-prints, samples, supplements and other products at NCT’s direction. The carriers pay for their own rubber bands and plastic bags used to assemble the papers. Some carriers buy the rubber bands and bags from Defendant, and others purchase them elsewhere. The carriers also pay for their own gas and automobile expenses they incur delivering the newspapers. 

Id. at *1.

In analyzing whether the primary factor in determining the employee-employer relationship, the right to control, is susceptible to common proof, the court found that the class members are all home-delivery newspaper carriers who work, or used to work, for Defendant. They all did the same job. Although there are differences between them, which Defendant lists in detail, whether they are independent contractors or employees is still susceptible to common proof. Thus, the Court found that common questions predominate on this issue.
Defendant argued that calculating damages on each of Plaintiffs’ causes of action would require individualized proof. The court rejected this argument stating that “although calculating damages is generally an individualized task, the Court finds that calculating them here would not require so much individualized analysis to defeat certification. That is mainly because Defendant has kept extensive records.” Id. at *7. The Court concluded that the “calculation of the [damages] for each individual [carrier], if necessary, will likely be fairly mechanical.” Id. at *8.
Thus, the Court certified the Rule 23(b)(3) class.
By CHARLES H. JUNG

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Ninth Circuit Holds That Contracts Expressly Acknowledging Independent Contractor Status “Simply Not Significant” Under California’s Test of Employment”

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In Narayan v. EGL, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2010 WL 2735708 (9th Cir. July 13, 2010), the Ninth Circuit decided whether, assuming the existence of an employer-employee relationship in California, the employer may avoid its obligations under the Labor Code by inserting a clause in an employer-drafted pre-printed form contract in which: (1) the employee acknowledges that he is an independent contractor and (2) agrees that the contract would be interpreted in accordance with the laws of another jurisdiction where such an agreement is generally enforceable.  Judge Ronald M. Whyte of the Northern District of California found that declarations in the underlying agreements stating that the drivers were independent contractors rather than employees compelled the holding that the plaintiffs were indeed independent contractors as a matter of law.  Id. at *2.  Consequently, the district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment.  The Ninth Circuit reversed.

EGL, the employer, is a global transportation, supply chain management and information services company incorporated under the laws of Texas and headquartered in Texas.  EGL’s services include, inter alia, “air and ocean freight forwarding, customs brokerage, [and] local pickup and delivery service.” Plaintiff drivers (the “Drivers”) were residents of California who were engaged to provide freight pick-up and delivery services for EGL in California. All three Drivers signed agreements with EGL for “Leased Equipment and Independent Contractor Services” (the “Agreements”). The Agreements provided that the “intention of the parties is to … create a vendor/vendee relationship between Contractor and [EGL],” and acknowledged that “[n]either Contractor nor any of its employees or agents shall be considered to be employees of” EGL. The terms of the Agreements provide, inter alia, that the Drivers “shall exercise independent discretion and judgment to determine the method, manner and means of performance of its contractual obligations,” although EGL retained the right to “issue reasonable and lawful instructions regarding the results to be accomplished.”  Id. at *1.

The Ninth Circuit noted the difficultly in overcoming the  Drivers’  prima facie case that the relationship was one of employer/employee. “This hurdle is particularly difficult for EGL to overcome in light of the second special consideration in this case, namely, the multi-faceted test that applies in resolving the issue whether the Drivers are employees.”  Id. at *4.

The Ninth Circuit described the multifactor approach to evaluating the:

indicia of an employment relationship, the most important of which is the “right to discharge at will, without cause.” Borello, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d at 404 (quoting Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins.App. Bd., 2 Cal.3d 943, 88 Cal.Rptr. 175, 471 P.2d 975, 979 (Cal.1970)). Borello endorsed other factors derived from the Restatement (Second) of Agency that may point to an employment relationship:  (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.

Id. at *4.

The Court concluded that the “fact that the Drivers here had contracts ‘expressly acknowledging that they were independent contractors’ is simply not significant under California’s test of employment.” Id. at *8 (citing Borello, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d at 403 (“The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced.”)).

The Court evaluated the various indicia of employment and concluded that:

Ultimately, under California’s multi-faceted test of employment, there existed at the very least sufficient indicia of an employment relationship between the plaintiff Drivers and EGL such that a reasonable jury could find the existence of such a relationship. Indeed, although it plays no role in our decision to deny summary judgment, it is not without significance that, applying comparable factors to those that we apply here, the Internal Revenue Service (at EGL’s request) and the Employment Development Department of California (at Narayan’s request) have determined that Narayan was an employee for federal tax purposes (applying federal law) and California Unemployment or Disability Insurance (applying California law), respectively.

Id. at *8.

UPDATE:

On August 5, 2010, the Ninth Circuit amended its holding, highlighted above.

By CHARLES H. JUNG

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In Trade Secrets Case Related to Barnes and Noble’s Nook Device: Court Grants Partial Summary Judgment Based on Disclosure of Secrets in Patent Applications, But Rejects UTSA Preemption Argument as Premature

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The Northern District of California granted partial summary judgment to a defendant in a trade secrets case on the ground that plaintiff disclosed its information to the public in its published patent applications.  Spring Design, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC, No. C 09-05185 JW, 2010 WL 5422556 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2010) (slip op.).  The court rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s UCL claim was preempted by the UTSA because “if the confidential information is not a trade secret, then preemption would not apply because the claim would seek a civil remedy not based on the  misappropriation of a trade secret.” Id. *10.

Background

In 2006 and 2007, Plaintiff filed several patent applications which claim different variations of an eReader with a dual-display design, consisting of an electronic paper display (“EPD”) and a liquid crystal display (“LCD”).  Id. *1.  In 2009, Plaintiff and Defendant explored possible collaboration on an eReader, and the parties entered into a nondisclosure agreement (“NDA”) in which the parties agreed not to disclose, reproduce, transmit or use the other’s confidential information except to certain employees on a need-to-know basis.  Id. From February to October 2009, Plaintiff and Defendant conducted several meetings and exchanged emails regarding Plaintiff’s eReader technology.  But on October 20, 2009, Defendant announced the release of the NOOK—its Android-based, dual-screen eReader.  Id. *2.  In 2010, Plaintiff launched its competing eReader device, the Alex, which is also a dual-screen eReader. Id.

Plaintiff Spring Design, Inc. brought an action Barnesandnoble.com, LLC alleging, inter alia, misappropriation of trade secrets and violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200, et. seqId. *1.Plaintiff alleged that Barnesandnoble.com used Plaintiff’s confidential information to develop a competing eReader device, the Nook, in violation of the parties’ non-disclosure agreement.Id. The parties brought cross motions for summary judgment.

Discussion

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the UTSA cause of action on the grounds that, inter alia: Plaintiff’s information does not qualify for trade secret protection because Plaintiff disclosed its information to the public in its published patent applications.  Id. **3-4. Continue reading

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Northern District Denies Certification of Joe’s Crab Shack Meal and Rest Break Class Action

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The Northern District of California denied class certification of a meal and rest break class action in Washington v. Joe’s Crab Shack, No. C 08-5551 PJH, 2010 WL 5396041 (N.D. Cal Dec. 23, 2010.) (slip op.).  Plaintiff Drew Garrett Washington asserted that defendant Crab Addison, Inc. (“Crab Addison”), a company that operates a number of Joe’s Crab Shack restaurants, failed to provide employees with meal and rest breaks, allowed its restaurant managers to manipulate employee time records to deprive employees of pay for all hours worked (including overtime and missed meal break pay), required employees to perform work “off the clock”; and required employees to pay for their own employer-mandated uniforms.  Id. *1.

Class Definition

Plaintiff moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, to certify a plaintiff class consisting of “all non-exempt restaurant employees employed by Crab Addison at Joe’s Crab Shack restaurants in California from January 1, 2007, through the present.”

Discussion

The court denied the certification motion.  Id. *11.  “Plaintiff’s position is that common questions predominate because the main issue is whether—notwithstanding Crab Addison’s written policies—Joe’s Crab Shack restaurants in California followed a common unwritten policy of denying meal and rest breaks, failing to pay employees who did not take breaks, failing to pay for overtime, requiring employees to purchase their own uniforms, and so forth.” Id. Plaintiff contended that the existence of a policy or practice that in effect contradicts Crab Addison’s written policies can be ascertained by an analysis of the data in Crab Addison’s computer systems.  Id. “But since plaintiff has failed to adequately explain how that analysis works and exactly what the data shows, he has failed to adequately establish the existence of such a policy or practice.” Id. Continue reading

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